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International policies and in particular EU and 
US policies towards Hamas and Hizbollah have 
had multiple and interlocking effects in the last 
two years. Most visibly, western policies have 
impacted upon the two movements themselves, 
on the domestic governance systems in Palestine 
and Lebanon, and on the relations between 
Hamas and Hizbollah and their respective domestic 
political rivals. In turn, they have also had an impact on 
the conflicts between Israel and Palestine/Lebanon, and 
on the mediating roles of the international community. 
The balance sheet is far from positive. Paradoxically, 
western policies have often hampered the quest for 
international peace, democracy and good governance, 
as well as inter- and intra-state reconciliation. This 
Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of the impact 
of western policies on three principal domestic and 
international dimensions of the Middle Eastern 
conundrum: 
  the transformation and popularity of Hamas and 
Hizbollah, 
  Lebanese and Palestinian governance and 
  intra-Lebanese and Palestinian reconciliation. 
The impact of western policies on the 
transformation and popularity of Hamas 
and Hizbollah 
Western policies have not succeeded in their intention 
to weaken Hamas and Hizbollah, and have on the 
contrary entrenched their popular legitimacy. Both 
Hamas and Hizbollah are mass political movements 
with large-scale and growing popular bases, a fact that 
western policies seem to have willingly ignored. 
Hizbollah first emerged as a highly ideological/religious 
and internationalist resistance movement.
1 The party 
was established in the context of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, which hit Lebanon’s south – densely 
                                                 
1 Talal Atrissi (2007), Hizbollah and Political Islam in 
Lebanon, CEPS Working Document, forthcoming, CEPS, 
Brussels.  
populated by Shiites. In articulating its resistance 
identity, Hizbollah opted for an ideological, 
internationalist and revolutionary outlook, taking as its 
inspiration the Iranian revolution, which over the years 
was consolidated through Iranian finance and training. 
Hizbollah’s resistance identity persisted after the 1989 
Taef accords, when it retained separate militias in the 
south, which ultimately contributed to Israel’s withdraw 
from Lebanon in 2000.  
Yet beyond resistance, Hizbollah gradually also 
developed into a Lebanese political force. While its 
1985 ‘open letter’ placed primary emphasis on 
Hizbollah’s international rather than Lebanese character 
and rejected participation in Lebanon’s institutions, 
Hizbollah’s identity progressively changed with and 
after its participation in the 1992 elections. This entailed 
a growing focus on Lebanese rather than international 
problems. Hence, Hizbollah refocused its attention 
exclusively on Israel’s continuing occupation of the 
Sheba farms post-2000 rather than of Palestinian 
territories. It also entailed a growing acceptance of the 
specificities of the Lebanese political system and in 
particular its confessional nature, which it had hitherto 
opposed. In turn, Hizbollah renounced any aspiration to 
enforce Islamic law in Lebanon and accepted that 
Lebanon could only be governed through a delicate 
inter-confessional balance. 
This transformation in the nature and strategy of 
Hizbollah was determined above all by changing Middle 
Eastern politics and power balances. Just as the Iranian 
revolution and its success in overthrowing the Shah had 
inspired Hizbollah’s early internationalist and 
revolutionary outlook, the death of Khomeini coupled 
with the post-cold war and post-Gulf war 
reconfiguration of the Middle East induced Hizbollah to 
redirect its attention to Lebanon. At the same time, 
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Israel’s occupation of Lebanon until 2000, its ongoing 
occupation of the Sheba farms and its war in Lebanon 
in the summer of 2006 continued to feed Hizbollah’s 
resistance identity, even while it was abandoning its 
revolutionary character. Finally, the 2003 war in Iraq, 
the 2005 assassination of Refik Hariri and the ensuing 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon have all strengthened 
the rationale for Hizbollah’s tightening ties with Iran 
and Syria – political, financial and, in the case of Iran, 
ideological. Western policies do not appear to have had 
a discernible direct role in these developments, beyond 
naturally influencing the wider Middle Eastern 
spectrum.  
In contrast to Hizbollah, Hamas has transformed itself 
into, rather then being born as a resistance movement. 
Hamas emerged in the 1980s as a social movement 
conducting charity-based social work, and only later 
developed into a militant group in the 1990s. Like 
Hizbollah, by the turn of the century, Hamas also 
shifted into the domestic political arena, entailing its 
growing co-option into Palestinian political dynamics. 
Moving away from its rejection of both the PLO
2 and 
the PA, Hamas has participated in municipal elections 
since 2004, in the 2006 parliamentary elections and in 
the ensuing PA governments. It has also officially 
requested to be included in the PLO since the March 
2005 Cairo Declaration. Hamas’ co-option into the 
Palestinian political system has led to an incremental 
change in its political strategy. Its participation in the 
PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) and the PA since 
2006 meant that its outright rejection of the Oslo 
accords (by which the PA was legally founded) was no 
longer tenable. Likewise, its claims to enter the PLO, 
whose 1988 Charter endorsed a two-state solution, 
meant that its categorical non-recognition of the State of 
Israel became more nuanced. This gradual co-option 
into the Palestinian political system is by no means 
irreversible. Far more than Fateh, which particularly 
during Arafat’s era was highly centralised, Hamas, like 
Hizbollah, has a diversified leadership. There are 
several currents within Hamas pushing the movement in 
different directions. These can be roughly sub-divided 
between currents closer to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
currents that are more pragmatic and technocratic in 
nature, and currents that are more prone to 
confrontation and violence. In other words, Hamas’ 
transformation is the product of the movement’s 
changing internal balances. 
The reasons for Hamas’ transformation lie first and 
foremost in domestic Palestinian politics. Hamas’ entry 
into the domestic political arena is the product of 
domestic political calculations, i.e. its growing 
popularity due to the failure of the Oslo process and 
Fateh’s failures in governance and the peace process 
with Israel.
3 A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  H i z b o l l a h ,  w e s t e r n  
                                                 
2 See for example Hamas’ condemnation of the PLO’s 
secular nature in Article 27 of its Charter. 
3 Interview with expert involved in Hamas’ electoral 
campaign, Birzeit, May 2007.  
policies played no role in inducing Hamas’ 
transformation into a mass domestic political force. 
Western policies did not even influence noticeably the 
progressive shift in Hamas’ political strategy, and in 
particular its growing implicit acceptance of a two-state 
solution, which was consolidated with the February 
2007 Mecca agreement. According to all interlocutors in 
the region, the principal reasons for these shifts lie in 
Hamas’ decision to enter the PA and the PLO, and 
Hamas’ awareness of the necessity to compromise with 
Fateh in order to do so. 
If western policies have had any impact on either Hamas 
or Hizbollah and their respective roles in Palestinian and 
Lebanese societies, they have been, in this author’s 
view, counterproductive. The US, in particular, and to a 
lesser extent, the EU have opted for a strategy of hard 
negative conditionality towards both movements, i.e. the 
threat of inflicting punishment (such as sanctions) or 
withdrawing benefits (such as aid or diplomatic 
contacts) unless certain conditions are met. Hizbollah is 
included in the US terrorist list, while Hamas is 
considered a terrorist organisation by both the EU and 
the US. In addition, since Hamas entered the PLC and 
the PA, both the US and the EU in the context of the 
Quartet have insisted on three ‘principles’ (see below), 
which evolved into becoming de facto conditions for 
their having contacts with the Hamas government, and 
the delivery of aid to it.
4  
In view of the inclusion of Hamas on the EU and US 
terrorist lists, some form of conditionality was 
necessary. Most evidently, for normal diplomatic 
contacts to take place, Hamas would have to be 
removed from the terrorist lists and to do so it would 
have to demonstrate its disavowal of terrorism. Yet the 
US and the EU, and in turn the rest of the Quartet, went 
much further, a mere five days after the Palestinian 
elections. On 30 January 2006, the Quartet announced 
that only if Hamas i) renounced violence, ii) accepted 
previous agreements and iii) recognised Israel (or 
according to some, Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish 
state), would the Quartet deal with the PA government.  
With the exception of the conditionality on violence, 
these political conditions are legally dubious, a fact 
whose seriousness is magnified by the participation of 
the UN, in the Quartet. The conditionality on Israel’s 
recognition has no legal grounding in so far as only 
states (and at most the PLO as the internationally 
recognised representative of the Palestinian people, of 
which Hamas is not yet part), and not political parties, 
can recognise other states. Furthermore, as Palestinians 
promptly note, the peace process between Israel and 
other Arab states has never been made conditional upon 
the Arab world’s recognition of Israel or its right to 
exist. Yet this demand was placed on the PA, leaving 
                                                 
4 On the evolution of this policy, see Alvaro de Soto 
(2007), End of Mission Report, May 2007, reprinted in The 
Guardian, 14 June, pp. 17-19 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
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unanswered the key question of on which borders 
should Israel be recognised, not to mention the fact that 
the PLO’s recognition of Israel in 1988 hardly brought 
with it tangible gains for the Palestinians. Moreover, 
little attention was paid to the fact that the same 
conditions had been flouted by Israel over the years. 
The international community has in fact repeatedly 
condemned Israel for its disproportionate use of force 
harming Palestinian civilians and its violation of 
international law and previous signed agreements. 
Regarding the acceptance of previous agreements in 
particular, it was Sharon’s government in March 2001 – 
and not the PA – that first claimed it would only 
‘respect’ rather than ‘accept’ previous agreements, 
adding to this that its respect would be conditional on 
the conduct of the other side.
5  
Predictably Hamas, the Hamas-only and the ensuing 
National Unity Government (NUG) did not fully 
endorse the three conditions. While refraining from the 
use of suicide attacks against Israel since the 2005 
Cairo Declaration, Hamas and the NUG – on the basis 
of Article 3 of the May 2006 prisoners’ document – did 
not renounce the use of violent resistance. Neither did 
Hamas nor the PA ‘accept’ previous agreements, but 
rather agreed to ‘respect’ them at Mecca. While Khaled 
Meshal has repeatedly declared that “[i]t is true that in 
reality there will be an entity or state called Israel on the 
rest of Palestinian land”,
6 the Hamas leader has also 
stated that “[t]he agreement reached at Mecca does not 
mean recognition of the Israeli entity”.
7 In response, the 
US, the EU, and surprisingly also the UN boycotted the 
PA, and the EU and the US withheld assistance to it.
8  
In punishing Hamas and Hizbollah, the Bush 
administration seems to have aimed at weakening or 
defeating the two movements. Others, principally in 
Europe, hoped to induce their ‘moderation’ or 
‘cooptation’. Both aims have failed, and their failure 
appears rooted in the lack of understanding of the two 
movements and their roles in their respective societies. 
Aiming to defeat Hizbollah or Hamas through violence, 
sanctions and boycotts misses the key political reality 
that – unlike global jihadist groups – both are mass 
nationalist movements, which are by now deeply 
engrained in Lebanese and Palestinian societies. As 
such they cannot be eradicated through targeted 
negative international policies.  
Neither have western policies weakened the two 
movements. On the contrary, by supporting Israel, 
undermining democratic processes, and imposing 
                                                 
5 Akiva Eldar (2007), “The Syrian secret Sharon did not 
reveal to Olmert”, Haaretz, 20 March. 
6 Orly Halpern (2007), “Experts question wisdom of 
boycotting Hamas”, Forward, 9 February. 
7 “Behind the headlines: Hamas-Fateh agreement does not 
meet requirements of the international community”, BBC 
Arabic Service, 16 February. 
8 For a critical assessment of the UN’s approach see 
Alvaro de Soto (2007), op. cit. 
sanctions on a democratically elected government and a 
population under occupation, Western policies have 
discredited their legitimacy and enhanced the resistance 
images Hamas and Hizbollah in the region. Hizbollah’s 
resistance to Israel, unstopped for 34 days by the 
international community (and indeed encouraged by 
some quarters in Washington), or Hamas’ persistence in 
government despite international sanctions and Israel’s 
attacks and imprisonments, have at the very least left the 
domestic popularities of these two movements 
untarnished. In fact, these policies have most likely 
raised support for the two movements.
9 In the case of 
Hamas, it is also important to note that amongst the 
most harshly hit by Western sanctions have been PA 
employees, the vast majority of whom are Fateh 
supporters. 
Finally, while both Hamas and Hizbollah have become 
increasingly co-opted into their respective political 
systems, this has occurred in spite of rather than because 
of Western policies. Indeed, especially in the case of 
Palestine, far from inducing Hamas to accept the 
Quartet’s conditions, western policies could re-empower 
currents within Hamas that are more prone to violence 
and refuse engagement with Israel. Hamas’ take-over of 
Gaza suggests that these developments may well already 
be happening. As the honeymoon of the NUG came to 
an end in May-June 2007, in view of persistent 
international boycotts and stalemate on the reunification 
of the security apparatuses, the more extreme fringes 
within Hamas (largely not represented in the NUG and 
thus not having a stake in it) routed the PA’s security 
apparatus in Gaza after violent fighting in mid-June 
2006.  
The impact of western policies on 
Lebanese and Palestinian governance 
Western policies towards Hamas and Hizbollah have 
also had a problematic impact on the evolution of 
democracy and governance in Palestine and Lebanon.  
In the case of Palestine, both the US and the EU have 
repeatedly called for democracy and good governance, 
and indeed the Bush administration made the reform of 
the Arafat-led PA a sine qua non for the resumption of 
the peace process in 2001-02. Beyond declarations, the 
EU in particular has supported democracy and good 
governance in Palestine in several ways. In 2001-05, it 
carefully conditioned its budgetary assistance to reforms 
in the fiscal, judicial, executive and administrative 
domains of the PA, and it provided financial and 
technical support for elections and technical reforms.  
Yet subsequent policies towards Hamas since 2006, by 
trumping all other aims, have undercut the West’s own 
professed aims in Palestine. Hamas’ electoral victory 
presented the international community with critical 
challenges and opportunities. First, Hamas’ participation 
in elections offered the opportunity to overcome a major 
                                                 
9 Interview by author with independent member of the 
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anomaly in Palestinian political life: the existence of an 
increasingly popular mass movement operating outside 
the legal confines and control of the Palestinian political 
system, and carrying out acts of violence, including war 
crimes, in its struggle against Israel.
10 Including Hamas 
in the legal Palestinian political system could have 
opened the prospect for a much-needed Palestinian re-
think of their national liberation strategy within the 
confines of the law. This all the more so given that 
Hamas itself, far from expecting a landslide electoral 
victory and not quite knowing how to handle 
governance, had invited Fateh to join a coalition 
government in January 2006. Second, Hamas’ victory 
presented the opportunity for a healthy transition of 
power in Palestine, a critical transition in view of the 
symbiosis between the PA and the PLO’s political 
class, represented principally by Fateh and constituted 
predominantly by returnees from Tunis.
11 This 
transition not only offered the scope for greater 
democracy and better governance, but it could also have 
provided the necessary stimulus for the rejuvenation of 
Fateh. Related to this, this transition of power could 
have added momentum to the reform of PA institutions. 
Capitalising on Fateh’s ill-governance, Hamas’ 14-page 
‘Change and Reform’ electoral platform, and its clean-
hands reputation in the governance of municipalities 
could have provided an additional push in the reform 
efforts supported by the West. 
Unfortunately, however, none of this occurred. 
Following Hamas’ rejection of the Quartet’s principles, 
the West boycotted the PA government, withheld aid to 
it, and the international community froze international 
bank transactions in Palestine in view of the US 
Congress’ Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act.
12 In addition, 
Israel, in violation of previous agreements and 
international law, has withheld Palestinian tax revenues 
since January 2006 (approximately $50 million per 
                                                 
10 During the second intifada, Hamas was associated with 
a wave of suicide attacks against Israel, which have been 
defined by the international community and international 
NGOs as war crimes. The last suicide attack carried out by 
Hamas was on 18 January 2005, at the Gush Khatif 
checkpoint. At the March 2005 Cairo Declaration, Hamas 
accepted a tahadia,  or lull in violence. While stopping 
suicide attacks, Hamas has nevertheless engaged in 
shooting and rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel, 
particularly since the summer of 2006. By contrast, the last 
suicide attack carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades, 
affiliated to Fateh, together with Islamic Jihad, was carried 
out on 29 January 2007 in Eilat.  
11 In this respect it is interesting to note that Hamas’ 
political class is considerably younger than that of the 
PLO/Fateh, and it is constituted predominantly by 
Palestinians indigenous to the OTs. On this see Benoit 
Challand (2007), “Il 67 e la trasformazione del baricentro 
palestinese: potere e confine sociali e politici”, paper 
presented at SESAMO, Sei Giorni e Quarant’Anni, 12 
May 2007, Florence.  
12 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-
4681 
month amounting to one-third of the PA’s monthly 
revenues), it has repeatedly arrested dozens of Hamas 
ministers and parliamentarians, and it has restricted their 
movement both between the West Bank and Gaza and 
within the West Bank and Jerusalem. In addition, the 
PA government has also been boycotted from the inside. 
In view of the symbiotic relationship between Fateh and 
the PA, the new government took office in a hostile 
internal environment in which the vast majority of 
public employees were affiliated with Fateh. This 
culminated in the 4-month strike by public sector 
employees in the fall of 2006, which paralysed the 
crumbling PA. In other words, western sanctions, 
coupled with Israel’s policies and internal power 
politics, made Western pleas for democracy and good 
governance in Palestine appear only as a stunning 
illustration of the notorious double standards. 
But not only have western policies contributed to a 
paralysis of the PA, the resumption of assistance since 
June 2006 has contributed to a reversal of the few steps 
forward made in Palestinian governance in 2002-05. In 
early 2006, international and Israeli policies were 
pushing Palestine to a dangerous humanitarian and 
economic brink, setting off alarm bells from UN 
agencies, the World Bank and international NGOs.
13 In 
response, at the EU’s instigation, the Quartet agreed on 
a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM): a 
mechanism through which funds would be channelled to 
the Occupied Territories (OTs) while bypassing the PA 
with the exception of the presidency. The TIM indeed 
pulled the OTs back from the brink, providing social 
allowances (rather than full salaries) to almost 90% of 
non-security public sector employees and emergency 
assistance and food aid for approximately 73,000 low-
income households. It also provided direct financial and 
material support to the health, education, water and 
social sectors, channelled though international agencies 
and NGOs, as well as funds to pay fuel bills (principally 
to Israeli providers) after Israel’s destruction of the 
power-plant in Gaza. The TIM, coupled with the 
growing need for humanitarian assistance, led to a 
critical rise in western assistance to the OTs. Between 
2006 and 2007, in the words of UN envoy de Soto, 
“Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the 
PA than what they previously spent in supporting it”.
14 
Indeed EU aid to the OTs (including member states) 
rose by 30% in one year, totalling €700 million in early 
2007.  
While preventing a much-dreaded humanitarian 
catastrophe, the sanctions regime and the ensuing TIM 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the Office of the Special Envoy for 
Disengagement (2006), Periodic Report, April; United 
Nations (2006), Assessment of the Future Humanitarian 
Risks in the Occupied Palestinian territory, 11 April; or 
Oxfam (2007) “Poverty in Palestine: The human cost of 
the financial boycott”, Briefing Note, April 
(http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bn070413_palestinian_aid
_boycott.pdf/download). 
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had catastrophic effects on Palestinian governance. In 
terms of civilian rule, the OTs increasingly resembled a 
semi-international protectorate, in which Palestinian 
institutions function predominantly as a skeleton 
allowing the international community to deliver aid to 
the population under occupation.
15 This has had several 
detrimental effects. First, the PA no longer remotely 
resembles a state-in-the making. As such, the PA is 
largely absolved from any responsibility towards its 
public regarding both governance and internal security. 
In this respect, a recent declaration by Khaled Meshal is 
revealing: “we are determined to make sure that the 
recent internal fighting, which appalled our people and 
dismayed their supporters around the world, becomes 
history.  We firmly believe that it would have never 
happened had it not been for foreign intervention and 
the brutal sanctions imposed on our people by Israel 
and its allies”.
16 Indeed, despite Hamas’ non-delivery 
on its ‘Change and Reform’ platform and the spiralling 
security situation on the ground, Palestinians have by 
and large not held Hamas responsible.
17  
Second, the sanctions and the TIM have reversed the 
few steps forward made in PA governance reform in 
previous years. The bypassing of official institutions 
with the exception of the presidency has led to a re-
centralisation of powers in Abbas’ hands. This situation 
drew much criticism from the West during Arafat’s 
rule. It has also generated an increasingly 
unaccountable and opaque management of the available 
PA funds. It is revealing that when Salam Fayyad, 
former Finance Minister under Ahmed Qureia’s 
governments, was re-nominated minister under the 
2007 NUG, he set out to repeat the fiscal reforms he 
had implemented three years earlier.
18 Finally, the TIM 
and its focus on humanitarian rather than development 
assistance has generated a dangerous culture of 
dependence in the OTs. Whereas for example in 2005 
only 16% of EU aid to Palestine constituted 
humanitarian assistance, this rose to 56% by the end of 
2006.
19  
Finally, western policies have contributed to Gaza’s 
dangerous slide into chaos and lawlessness. Beyond the 
boycott of the PA, the EU and US have not held Israel 
accountable to its legal obligations, including the 
                                                 
15 The principal difference between the OTs and an 
international protectorate, lies in the fact that while the 
occupying power has (quite willingly) delegated its 
civilian obligations to the international community, it 
retains full control over security-related rights and 
obligations in both Gaza and the West Bank.   
16 Khaled Meshal (2007) ‘Our unity can now pave the way 
for peace and justice’ The Guardian, 13 February. 
17 Interviews with Palestinian analysts, Jerusalem and 
Ramallah, May 2007.  
18 Chris Patten (2007), “Time to judge Palestine on its 
results”, Financial Times, 13 March, Opinion.. 
19 Steven Erlanger (2007), “Aid to Palestinians Rose 
despite Embargo”, New York Times, 21 March. 
delivery of tax revenues, the easing on restrictions on 
movement and its implementation of the November 
2005 Movement and Access Agreement. Admittedly, 
the EU has repeatedly called upon Israel to deliver,
20 yet 
neither the EU nor the US has followed up its words 
with action. The EU has also not objected to carrying 
out its border monitoring mission at Rafah according to 
Israel’s decisions (thus accepting the border crossing to 
be closed over 40% of the time, and permanently so 
since the end of the NUG in June 2007). The ensuing 
absence of effective Palestinian government and Israel’s 
hold over the Gaza Strip have created fertile ground for 
criminal mafia-style gangs and al-Qaeda-like cells to 
operate in Gaza’s open-air prison.
21 Beyond threatening 
Gazans (e.g. the bombs planted in Gaza’s internet cafés) 
and international staff (such as the kidnapping of BBC 
journalist Alan Johnston), the growth of criminal gangs 
and Islamist cells also poses a threat to Hamas. The 
emergence of small Islamist groups cages Hamas in. On 
the one hand, having been co-opted into the PA, 
extremist militant groups appeal to disaffected and 
radicalised segments of Hamas’ constituency. On the 
other hand, Hamas is further delegitimised by the 
international community by being associated with these 
al-Qaeda-like groups by the West. It is notable that in a 
May 2007 statement, the Quartet jointly condemned in 
the same sentence “Hamas and other terrorist groups in 
Gaza”.
22 Since the end of street fighting in Gaza and 
Hamas’ take-over of the Strip in June 2007, the internal 
security situation has improved. In particular, Hamas’ 
executive force succeeded in liberating BBC journalist 
Alan Jonhston, captured by the jihadist group Jund al-
Islam, linked to the Dagamush clan in the Strip. Yet 
while law and order may have improved, it is unlikely 
that Hamas can restore governance, let alone 
development, in Gaza without a reversal of Western and 
Israeli policies towards Hamas. Since June 2007, the 
Rafah crossing has remained closed, entry access for 
humanitarian assistance remains limited and salaries to 
Hamas affiliated public employees remain unpaid.
23  
Turning to Lebanon, the EU in particular has placed 
much emphasis on democratic and governance reforms. 
Especially since Lebanon was included in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 and the EU published an 
ENP Action Plan for Lebanon in 2007, the Commission 
has carefully spelled out in agreement with the 
Lebanese government a wide array of reform priorities 
across different policy fields. The Action Plan includes 
                                                 
20 EU General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(2007)  Conclusions on Middle East Peace Process, 23 
April, Luxembourg, 2796th Meeting, paragraph 6.  
21 On Israel’s persisting control over the Gaza Strip 
following disengagement, see Gisha (2007), “Disengaged 
Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza”, January.  
22 Office of the Spokesman (2007), Joint Statement of the 
Quartet, Potsdam, Germany, 30 May.  
23 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) (2007), Gaza Humanitarian Situation Report, 28 
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priorities in the fields of democracy (e.g. reform of the 
electoral law), human rights and the rule of law (e.g. the 
adoption of a human rights strategy) and institution-
building (e.g. security sector reform). To support these 
nationally-agreed reform priorities, the Union has 
declared its willingness to offer Lebanon a “stake in the 
single market”, enhanced political cooperation and 
dialogue and support in legislative approximation aimed 
at reducing trade barriers. Most significantly, at the 
January 2007 donor conference for Lebanon, the EU 
pledged $520 million, France a further $650 million and 
the US $1 billion in assistance.
24 In addition, the 
European Investment Bank has committed €960 million 
in loans. EU funds have been earmarked for political 
and economic reforms, economic recovery, 
reconstruction, infrastructure rehabilitation, de-mining 
and assistance to Palestinian refugees.  
In presenting these reform priorities and the policy and 
financial instruments to support them, the West, and in 
particular the EU, has repeatedly underlined the need 
for a national and inter-confessional understanding and 
agreement. The Commission stated that “[o]nly if the 
reform process is backed by a national pact, 
encompassing all political forces as well as religious 
and ethnic groups, and thereby overcoming political 
rivalry, vested interests and clientelism, will it have a 
chance of actually being implemented”.
25 Indeed this 
appeared to be the case when, after the 2005 Lebanese 
parliamentary elections, an inter-confessional governing 
coalition was established between the Future Movement 
(Sunni), the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) as well 
as the two Shiite parties, Amal and Hizbollah. It was 
during this period that negotiations between the EU and 
Lebanon on the Action Plan were carried out. Although 
the Action Plan was agreed in January 2007, it largely 
responded to the Government of Lebanon’s Ministerial 
Declaration of July 2005, a declaration made at a time 
when Hizbollah was represented in the Lebanese 
cabinet and parliament. Negotiations on the Action Plan 
were in fact carried out before May 2006, that is, before 
Hizbollah’s walk-out from the government in 
November that year. EU officials involved in the 
negotiations have privately noted Hizbollah’s 
constructive attitude in these talks.
26  
Notwithstanding the western appreciation of the need 
for a national pact, at no time did EU actors or the US 
express reservations regarding Hizbollah’s exit from 
government and its formation of an opposition front 
with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement in the fall 
of  2006. More worryingly, no action has been taken by 
                                                 
24 “Donors in aid boost for Lebanon”, BBC News, 25 
January 2007. 
25 European Commission (2007), “European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Lebanese 
Republic, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013”, and 
“National Indicative Programme 2007-2010”, p. 11. 
26 Interview with Commission official, November 2006, 
Brussels.  
the West to resolve the Lebanese impasse following the 
demonstrations and strikes organised by the 8 March 
opposition front in December 2006, the ensuing freeze 
in regular parliamentary activity and the ongoing 
political tensions and violence.  
The weakening of Lebanon’s governance due to the 
domestic stalemate between Fuad Siniora’s government 
and the Hizbollah-Aoun opposition front has been 
exposed and imperilled further by the confrontation with 
Fateh-al Islam in Nahr al-Bared and Jund-al Sham in 
Ain al-Helwa in May-June 2007. Similar to the situation 
in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon’s pockets of lawlessness and 
widespread poverty (notably in Palestinian refugee 
camps) have provided fertile ground for small al-Qaeda-
like cells to establish themselves and threaten both the 
Lebanese government and the Hizbollah-led opposition, 
as well as the Lebanese state as a whole. The external 
dimension in this last tragic twist in Lebanese politics is 
difficult to assess. Some argue that Fateh al-Islam has 
been financed by Syria to counter the Siniora 
government. Others suggest that these Salafi groups are 
close to the Future Front and have been supported by 
Saudi Arabia and thus indirectly by the West as a means 
to expose the weakness of the Lebanese army and 
empower UNIFIL to disarm these groups and Hizbollah 
and to control the border with Syria (through which 
Iranian financial and material support to Hizbollah is 
provided).
27 The truth in these and other allegations is 
difficult to ascertain, and possibly both may be partly 
true. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these 
explanations is that whether Syrian and/or 
Saudi/American, the external dimension of the current 
violence in Lebanon is highly likely, and it is 
dangerously weakening the fragile Lebanese state. 
Impact of western policies on intra-
Lebanese and Palestinian reconciliation 
The most worrying impact of western policies towards 
Hamas and Hizbollah is the polarizing effect they have 
had on intra-Palestinian and intra-Lebanese politics, 
polarisation that has led to tension and standstill in 
Lebanon and pushed the Gaza Strip into a bloody civil 
war and political separation from the West Bank.  
Despite its Islamist identity and evident appeal to the 
Shiite community, Hizbollah has traditionally opposed 
Lebanon’s confessional system, which maintains a 
careful balance of power between confessional 
communities in government, parliament and civic 
administration. It accuses the system of fostering 
corruption and undemocratic practices and hindering 
                                                 
27 See Seymour Hersh (2007), “The Redirection: Is the 
Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the 
war on terrorism?,” The New Yorker, 5 March; Jim Quilty 
(2007), “Winter of Lebanon’s Discontents”, MERIP, 26 
January. See also Jim Quilty (2007), “The Collateral 
damage of Lebanese Sovereignty”, MERIP, 18 June 
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modernisation and reform.
28 Hizbollah often declares 
that its neighbour Israel – a confessional state – is its 
starkest reminder of why of a mono-confessional 
system should be avoided.
29 Indeed following the 2005 
assassination of Refik Harari, Hizbollah’s leader Sayyid 
Nasrallah was amongst the first Lebanese actors to call 
for the resolution of the crisis through inter-
confessional dialogue and elections. In the elections and 
government that followed, Hizbollah entered a cross-
confessional government with the Future Movement, 
the Druze Socialist Party and the Shiite Amal. When 
Amal and Hizbollah left government, the ensuing 
cleavages between government and opposition 
continued to be cross-confessional, with the Shiite 
parties allying with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement. Furthermore, beyond Hizbollah’s demands 
for a blocking (1/3) minority in government (i.e. 8 
rather than 5 ministers in the 24 member Cabinet), 
amongst the official reasons for the walk-out was 
Hizbollah’s demand for a national unity government 
that included Aoun, a demand which the Future Front 
refused to concede. The cross-cutting confessional split 
in Lebanese politics notwithstanding, the current 
political situation is highly polarised between the 14 
March (government) and the 8 March (opposition) 
fronts, representing two political coalitions.  
In principle, the West and the EU in particular supports 
the reconciliation between Lebanese forces, as stated, 
inter alia, in UNSC resolutions 1559 (2004), 1701 and 
1680 (2006). More specifically, EU High 
Representative Javier Solana has called upon “the 
different leaders of the different forces [to] work 
together for all that supposes progress”, while 
Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP 
Benita Ferrero Walder has advocated a “pro-Lebanon 
                                                 
28 Confessionalism is a system of government that 
distributes political and institutional power proportionally 
among religious communities. Posts in government and 
seats in the legislature are apportioned amongst different 
groups according to the relative demographic composition 
of those groups in society. Proponents of confessionalism 
cite the confessional system as an effective way to secure 
the peaceful co-existence of diverse religious and ethnic 
communities by empowering each according to its 
‘weight’. Critics instead point out that such a system may 
actually deepen conflict between ethnic groups. They 
argue that whichever group holds the most political power 
may use government to favour itself at the expense of 
other groups, or even to oppress rival groups. Also, as 
demographics change, the positions and power held by a 
particular group may no longer appropriately reflect the 
size of that group. For more on Lebonon’s confessional 
system, see Julia Cooucair (2006), Lebanon: Finding a 
Path from Deadlock to Democracy, Carnegie Paper No. 
64, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, D.C., pp. 4-6. 
29 Interviews with Hizbollah representative, Beirut, June 
2007.  
consensus” amongst Lebanon’s political class, free from 
external interference by great powers.
30  
But alas, western policies have exacerbated this 
polarisation and the ensuing stalemate in governance. 
Beyond the disagreements on domestic power-sharing, 
representation and Hizbollah’s disarmament, the 
political split between the two fronts largely reflects 
their different views regarding Lebanon’s international 
alliances. The Future Front instead accuses Hizbollah of 
accepting Syrian and Iranian meddling in Lebanese 
affairs and thus hindering Lebanon’s much-sought 
sovereignty and independence. Hizbollah instead 
accuses the Future Front of acting as a western stooge 
and tacitly accepting Israel’s 2006 attack as a means to 
achieving Hizbollah’s disarmament. It also resents the 
American and French support for Siniora’s anti-Syrian 
coalition, and the one-sided approval by the Western 
media to the February-March 2005 demonstrations 
(dubbing these a ‘cedar revolution’), in contrast to their 
relative silence over the 2006 Hizbollah strikes and 
demonstrations. Indeed, amongst the triggers for 
Hizbollah’s government walk-out was the controversy 
over the UN Security Council resolution establishing an 
international tribunal for Hariri’s assassination and 
Hizbollah’s resentment towards Siniora for not having 
appropriately discussed the draft within the government.  
This resentment grew in view of Hizbollah’s 
reservations about the broad powers for criminal 
prosecution the UN draft entrusted to the international 
community, resulting, in Hizbollah’s view, in a crucial 
limitation of Lebanese sovereignty and a legally 
sanctioned forum to prosecute Syria. Moreover, by 
passing the resolution under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter, Hizbollah is concerned that the powers 
entrusted to the international community would 
ultimately empower the West to forcefully disarm 
Hizbollah itself. This is a prospect that Hizbollah 
believes the Future Front is actually pushing for in view 
of its disappointed reaction to UNIFIL’s limited 
mandate under Chapter 6.
31 Prominent government 
leaders such as Walid Jumblatt (Socialist Progressive 
Party) have in fact openly called for a revision of 
UNIFIL’s mandate to ‘implement’ the provisions of the 
Taef accords and thus Hizbollah’s disarmament. Finally, 
Western aid to post-war Lebanon has also fuelled 
cleavages between government and opposition in view 
of the government’s refusal to share western funds with 
Hizbollah in order to reconstruct the devastated south, 
inducing Hizbollah to rely on Iranian funds to undertake 
                                                 
30 Press statement of Javier Solana, EU High 
Representative for the CFSP in Beirut, 16 July 2006, 
S203/06; Statement by Benita Ferrero Walder, 
Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP (2006), 
“Lebanon – Breaking the Impasse”, 16 December 
(http://www.dellbn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/06/dec06.htm). 
31 Amal Saad Ghorayeb (2007), “In their own words: 
Hizbollah’s strategy in the current confrontation”, 
Carnegie Policy Outlook, January. 8 | Nathalie Tocci 
these tasks, thus exacerbating the intra-Lebanese 
political divide. 
In the case of Palestine, polarisation took far graver 
proportions culminating in the slide towards civil war 
between Hamas and Fateh. The principal actors in this 
confrontation are concentrated in the security sector,and 
indeed a major source of division lies precisely in the 
control of the security services. The roots of this 
conflict lie in the 1990s, when Fateh’s Mohammed 
Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub, heads of the Preventive 
Security Forces in Gaza and the West Bank, 
respectively, undertook a series of arrests of Hamas 
militants in view of the wave of suicide attacks that 
followed the 1996 Hebron massacre.  
This latent conflict came to the fore after Hamas’ 2006 
electoral victory, when Fateh – in shock over its 
electoral defeat – refused to devolve power to the new 
government as well as to participate in a coalition with 
Hamas, fearing this would reinforce and legitimise 
Hamas further. In particular, despite the fact that 
reforms in the 2002-05 period had partly shifted control 
of the Palestinian security forces from the presidency to 
the Interior Ministry, Fateh refused to devolve security 
competences to the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry. 
In turn, Hamas established its own security apparatus, 
linked to its militant wing, the Iz’a din el Qassam (the 
Executive Forces), and pitching these against Abbas’ 
presidential guard led by Dahlan and linked to Fateh’s 
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. More generally, key 
elements in Fateh set out to make the Hamas 
government fall in order to return to power without 
having to compromise with it. In May-June 2006, 
President Abbas engaged in a series of ploys, including 
the call for a referendum on the ‘prisoners’ document’ 
and early elections in order to alter Hamas’ policies 
with respect to the conflict.
32 In the autumn, 
(predominantly Fateh-affiliated) PA employees went on 
a four-month strike, which, together with international 
sanctions, paralysed the Hamas-led PA. 
This is not to say that the two fronts were inevitably set 
for confrontation. There are important forces within 
each faction who supported reconciliation, as evidenced 
by Abbas’ support in 2005 for Hamas’ participation in 
elections, Hamas’ invitation to Fateh to join a coalition 
government in January 2006, and above all the two 
factions’ acceptance of the February 2007 Mecca 
agreement and the ensuing formation of the NUG. The 
latter was represented principally by Fateh (with six 
ministers, including the deputy prime minister) and 
Hamas (with nine ministers, including the prime 
minister) as well as by independent representatives 
nominated by either one faction (e.g. Fateh nominated 
the Foreign Minister – Ziad Abu Amr) or another (e.g. 
Hamas nominated the Interior Minister – Hani al-
Kawasmeh). There were strong forces pushing in favour 
of the Mecca accord. First and foremost was the 
impending threat of intra-Palestinian violence and civil 
                                                 
32 Interview with UN representative, Jerusalem, May 2007. 
war in Gaza, which in December 2006-January 2007 
had claimed over 100 lives.
33 According to one analyst, 
rather than national unity, the Mecca accord offered the 
scope for ‘national salvation’.
34 Both factions in fact 
realized that internal violence would completely 
discredit them vis-à-vis their constituencies.
35 Hamas in 
particular appreciated the fact that it could not counter 
the rising lawlessness and extremism in Gaza without a 
strong and united Palestinian security force. It also 
realised that unless it reached a compromise with Fateh, 
it would be unable to govern. Fateh instead seemed to 
appreciate that regaining power by force was not an 
option. Second, both factions were receptive to Saudi 
Arabia’s role and influence. Fateh saw this as a means 
to revive the Arab peace initiative and not appear as a 
western puppet in the eyes of its electorate, while at the 
same time compromising with Hamas without losing 
face with the US. Hamas saw the Saudi role as a means 
to gain legitimacy and standing in the Arab world.  
Interestingly, not a single interlocutor attributed the 
sanctions regime with having a direct impact on the 
incentives of the two factions to reach a national unity 
government. At most, some argued that sanctions 
contributed indirectly and in extremely costly ways to 
this outcome. By weakening Hamas’ capability, the 
sanctions – it is argued – contributed to a (bloody) 
balance of power between Hamas and Fateh, whereby a 
disgruntled and unmotivated Fateh would not 
completely ‘lose’ to Hamas given that the latter was 
being  weakened by external forces. This balance of 
power meant that the internal conflict could not be 
resolved through confrontation, but would require 
compromise. Yet in contrast to arguments suggesting 
that sanctions weakened Hamas into a compromise, one 
should note that it was Fateh and not Hamas that refused 
to form a coalition government a year earlier.  
The general view thus seems to be that a national 
compromise was reached in Mecca thanks to Saudi 
mediation in spite of rather than due to western policies. 
Yet, the reaction of the West would be pivotal in 
determining the fate of the newborn government. All 
interlocutors made two principal points. First and most 
intuitively, the government could only survive if it was 
allowed to function. In order for this to happen in a non-
state, aid-dependent and occupation-ridden situation, 
western aid would have to resume and Israel would have 
fulfil its legal obligations by delivering Palestinian tax 
money, easing restrictions on movement and releasing 
imprisoned Palestinian law-makers and ministers. 
Second and most challengingly, Palestinian security 
forces, effectively operating as militias for either one 
faction or the other, would have to be reunited, in order 
                                                 
33 This was the principal factor raised by all interviewees 
across the political spectrum in Jerusalem and Ramallah, 
May 2007. 
34 Interview in Jerusalem, May 2007.  
35 Interviews with Fateh, Hamas and independent 
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to foster reconciliation between the factions and allow 
the PA to restore law and order. Third, the government 
would have to show its electorate it could deliver some, 
even if marginal, successes in its relations with Israel, 
such as for example a prisoner exchange.  
None of this happened. Europeans, including the 
Commission and several member states initially showed 
cautious relief and optimism following the formation of 
the NUG. Indeed the Mecca accord and the NUG could 
have provided the much-sought route to escape the bind 
the Quartet ‘conditions’ had imposed upon them, and 
out of which they attempted to extricate themselves 
from through the TIM. But the tune from Washington 
remained unchanged, as the US (and Israel) soon made 
clear that the Mecca agreement and the ensuing NUG 
fell short of meeting the Quartet principles.
36 With the 
exception of non-EU states such as Norway or 
Switzerland which indeed opened formal contacts with 
Hamas, Europe followed Washington, muting its initial 
support for the NUG and retaining its boycott and aid 
block on the PA. The Union only marginally deviated 
from Washington’s stance by establishing contact with 
non-Hamas ministries.
37 Taking the cue from this line, 
the Commission reactivated its technical assistance to 
the Palestinian Ministry of Finance under the leadership 
of Salam Fayyad in June 2007. The EU’s policy 
reversal was thus marginal as well as ill-thought out. In 
the event that the NUG worked cohesively, the EU’s 
choice of dealing exclusively with non-Hamas members 
would be purely abstract, in so far as each and every 
member of the government would represent the NUG as 
a whole. In the event that the NUG failed, as turned out 
to be the case, the EU’s choice of one-sided contact and 
assistance would sow further divisions between Fateh 
and Hamas. 
More gravely, Israel continued withholding taxes to the 
PA, with the exception of $100 million allegedly 
delivered by Israel to the presidential guard (Fateh).
38 It 
also maintained movement restrictions and arrested 
further Hamas parliamentarians and ministers in the 
West Bank. Finally, the US continued to provide 
military assistance and training to Fateh militias.
39 
Since Hamas’ electoral victory, strong currents in the 
US have been fomenting confrontation between the two 
factions, hoping to see Fateh’s return to power through 
                                                 
36 Donald Macintyre (2007), “Israel at loggerheads with 
allies on boycott of Palestinian coalition”, The 
Independent, 18 March. 
37 Adam Entous (2007), “Britain to talk with non-Hamas 
ministers”, Reuters, 16 March. 
38 Adam Entous and H. Tamimi (2007), “Palestinian 
Abbas forces amassing arms”, Reuters, 28 January.   
39 See Alastair Crooke (2007,) “Our second biggest 
mistake in the Middle East”, London Review of Books, 5 
July.   
a hard coup if need be.
40 In early 2007, the US delivered 
$60 million in training and non-lethal weapons to the 
presidential guard and the newly founded National 
Security Council under Dahlan’s leadership. This had 
the effect of removing any incentives to unify the 
security forces under the PA Interior Ministry.
41  
All was set for a new round of confrontation in May-
June 2007. Over the course of a few weeks, Interior 
Minister Hani al-Kawasmeh resigned following Abbas’ 
refusal to unite the security forces, hundreds of US-
trained forces loyal to Mohammed Dahlan entered the 
Gaza Strip from Egypt, unprecedented street fighting 
and political violence re-erupted and Hamas violently 
took control of the security forces in the Strip. The 
violence culminated in mid-June 2007 with Hamas’ 
‘victory’ in Gaza, the flight of Fateh militants (including 
Mohammed Dahlan, Rashid Abu Shabak and Samir 
Mashharawi) to either the West Bank or Egypt, and 
Abbas’ dissolution of the NUG and nomination of a 
non-Hamas government in the West Bank under the 
premiership of Salam Fayyad. In response, the West, far 
from reversing its strategy, has reinforced it. It has 
immediately stated its willingness to work with the 
(unelected) Fayyad government in the West Bank and 
resumed aid and assistance to it. Israel has also declared 
its willingness of devolve approximately $300-400 
million of withheld PA tax money to the West Bank 
government.
42 In Gaza instead the West appears intent 
on defeating Hamas through a tightened boycott and 
isolation on the Strip.  
The future evolution of the OTs is difficult to predict. 
What can be safely concluded is that, unintentionally or 
not, western policies have contributed to this tragic 
outcome, having de facto fomented civil war and 
triggered a political, aside from the physical, separation 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
43 With this 
last tragic twist in events, the moribund two-state 
solution appears to have reached its final death-bed.  
Conclusions 
The international community and in particular the 
policies of the US and the EU have not achieved their 
intended results of weakening or ‘moderating’ either 
Hamas or Hizbollah. On the contrary, they have 
contributed to the stalemate in governance in Lebanon 
and the lawlessness and lack of governance in Palestine. 
                                                 
40 “Elliot Abrams’ uncivil war”, Conflict Forum, 7 January 
2007 (http://conflictsforum.org/2007/elliot-abrams-uncivil-
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Western policies have also fuelled polarisation and 
confrontation within both Palestine and Lebanon, 
leading most dramatically to a civil war in Gaza, the 
ensuing political split between the West Bank and 
Gaza, and with it the disappearance of any realistic 
prospect for a ‘two-state solution’. In addition, western 
sanctions and boycotts have complicated further the 
prospects for Arab-Israeli peace. The West has de facto 
inserted preconditions into the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. In conflict situations, it is normally the 
international community that engages in diplomatic 
acrobatics and at times exerts hard-nosed pressure to 
ensure that conflict parties abandon preconditions and 
similar delaying tactics for their engagement in 
negotiations. This was indeed the case in the Middle 
East since 2000, when Israel insisted on a set of 
preconditions for its reengagement with the 
Palestinians. Through its ‘principles’, this role has now 
been taken over by the Quartet. Israel’s ongoing 
preconditions and its illegal withholding of Palestinian 
revenues are simply presented as acts of compliance 
with Quartet’s policies.  
In doing so, the EU in particular has effectively out-
manoeuvred itself from having effective influence on 
the two conflicts. This is because its influence 
principally derives from its disbursal of financial 
assistance contingent upon the recipient’s compliance 
with specified conditions and rules. In Lebanon, while 
assistance is disbursed and Hizbollah has not been 
subject to sanctions and boycotts, aid is not being made 
contingent on efforts at national reconciliation between 
the two fronts, without which effective reconstruction 
and reform cannot be easily achieved. The sheer 
amount of European assistance to the war-torn country 
could, however, if carefully conditioned, prove to be a 
critical incentive to achieve national reconciliation, 
reform and, in due course, Hizbollah’s disarmament. 
In Palestine, the withholding of aid and the 
institutionalisation of the TIM have diminished the 
EU’s influence on the day-to-day development of 
Palestinian institutions and policies, entrenched its 
dependence on aid and undermined the reform process 
in the PA. The ensuing resumption of aid to the 
unelected Fateh government in the West Bank and 
continued boycott of the Hamas government in Gaza 
have entrenched the political separation between the 
West Bank and Gaza, while confirming in the eyes of 
the public the west’s lack of respect for democratic 
standards. If instead EU aid had been deployed on the 
basis of legally and politically sound conditions, it could 
have greatly contributed to inducing reconciliation 
between the factions, the development of a more 
coherent Palestinian national strategy and the 
establishment of good governance prior to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. 
These results are far removed from the EU’s policy 
intentions and objectives in the Middle East. The 
sentiment expressed by a US envoy to the Quartet who 
privately declared that he “like[d] this violence”, 
referring to the quasi-civil war in Gaza in early 2007, is 
certainly not shared by the vast majority of the public in 
the EU.
44 Most EU policy-makers closely involved in 
Middle Eastern affairs are also ready to recognise in 
private that the Union has often operated against its 
declared interests in the Middle East. The reason for this 
is largely rooted in the reality that, when decisions 
ultimately have to be taken, the EU is highly reluctant to 
break ranks with the United States. The same goes for 
the Quartet as a whole, which in de Soto’s words acts 
more as a “Group of Friends of the US” than as a 
mediating forum for the Middle East.
45 This has 
dramatically reduced the EU’s space for manoeuvre, 
confining it to working on the margins of US-dictated 
policies. There are voices within several member states 
that are agitating for the Union to give greater priority to 
its Middle Eastern interests alongside its transatlantic 
priorities. It is only if these voices can acquire greater 
weight within the EU that policy suggestions and indeed 
policy reversals can be contemplated and elaborated 
upon.  
                                                 
44 As reported by de Soto (2007, op. cit., p .21): “a week 
before the Mecca agreement in February 2007, the US 
envoy declared twice in an envoys meeting in Washington 
how much “I like this violence”, referring to the near-civil 
war that was erupting in Gaza in which civilians were 
being regularly killed and injured, because “it means that 
other Palestinians are resisting Hamas.” 
45 Quoted in Alvaro de Soto (2007, op.cit, p. 24). About CEPS
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